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DERIVING INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES FROM A
THEORY OF COMMUNICATION AND LAWMAKING
Mathew D. McCubbins'
Daniel B. Rodriguez
Statutes are best understood as a form of communication.
Communicating messages requires a sender and receiver. The
sender encodes her message in the form of communication, and
the receiver's task is to decode this message so that she can
understand what it means. In all forms of communication that
include commands, the challenge is to make sure that the
commands can be effectively decoded and thus implemented as
appropriate.' In short, we view statutory interpretation's
essential purpose as producing "a constitutionally legitimate
decoding of [ambiguous] statutory commands."2 Although
legislation is admittedly a very stylized rendering of a
multifaceted, complex structure of law, politics, and institutional
performance, we see value in reducing the far-flung objective of
interpreting legislation to a core purpose. With this core purpose
in mind, we can proceed to the critical task of evaluating
competing approaches to discerning statutory meaning.
The focus of this essay is to advance the conversation.
Part I recapitulates the basic elements of communication
theory and positive political theory, and their potent
applications to statutory interpretation. Part II explains how a
nuanced understanding of the lawmaking structure in
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' See Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from
Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (2007)
[hereinafter Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean]; Cheryl Boudreau et al., Statutory
Interpretation and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 2131 (2005)
[hereinafter Boudreau et al., The Intentionalist) Stance].
2 Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 959.
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Congress has valuable implications for understanding
statutory meaning. Finally, in Part III, we sketch some
thoughts about how the bridge between communication theory
and positive political theory can illuminate debates about the
use and misuse of extrinsic aids in interpretation, especially
the so-called canons of statutory interpretation.
While the normative question at the heart of the
enduring statutory-interpretation debate is whether and to
what extent legislative communications should be
authoritative,' we give that question a rest in this essay.
Rather, we are interested here in developing a model of
statutory meaning and looking hard at whether this model can
yield useful techniques for decoding statutes. Nor does this
essay focus on the central matter of statutory authority and the
dynamic relationship between legislatures and courts.
Although this issue has been prominent in other work we have
done separately and collaboratively,' we assume here that
statutes are constitutionally pedigreed commands and that the
objective of interpreting a statute is to recover its meaning
using a theory of both communication and lawmaking.
I. THE SCIENCE OF COMMUNICATION
While much of communication theory is motivated by
algorithms derived for compressing and then expanding messages
from one computer to another, the theory is quite general and has
been applied to viruses, bacteria, and other infectious agents, as
well as to speech and writing.' The act of writing a statute, when
reduced to its essentials, begins with an idea about what should
be policy. Second, this idea about policy information is compressed
into a written document. While great pains may be taken to
accurately compress ideas into language, this process is not
always perfect. Interpretive difficulties frequently arise; indeed,
they are perhaps inevitable given cognitive deficiencies, as well as
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH
GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (3d ed. 2006).
See sources cited supra note 1; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 Nw. U. L. REV.
1207 (2007); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its
Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003).
s See generally DAVID J.C. MACKAY, INFORMATION THEORY, INFERENCE, AND
LEARNING ALGORITHMS 3-5 (2003); J. R. PIERCE, SYMBOLS, SIGNALS AND NOISE: THE
NATURE AND PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION 8-9 (James R. Newman ed., 1961).
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the limits of language and the difficulty of constructing
institutions capable of successful compression.
Moreover, compression is done with an eye toward the
transmission, reception, and, ultimately, the expansion of the
document into meaning by the receiver. This is perhaps the key
takeaway point of communication theory: those who do the
compressing are necessarily aware of the need for the message
to be later expanded. Of course, it is well known that error and
biases can be introduced into the transmission and expansion,
causing the meaning to be distorted. These problems may or
may not be intentional; in any event, they are ubiquitous
problems and hence increase difficulties for communicators in
compressing the communication and for recipients in
expanding it. Third, the ideas about policy are transmitted over
a channel or channels. Fourth, the messages are received, and
the ideas that were compressed into written language are
expanded into meaning. This is the key: in perfectly operating
communication, not only is the transmission lossless (i.e., there
is no error) but the expansion is the inverse (or mirror image)
of the compression. The authors of messages often send other
messages in conjunction with the original (such as parity bits
in electronic communication) in order to reduce transmission
and expansion errors.
At an abstract level, our argument is based upon
overlapping common-sense views about the nature of
communication. By definition, communication requires a
sharing in common. Not only is this part of the etymology of the
term (the word "communication" derives from the Latin root
commanis') but it also makes good sense that one person's efforts
to communicate with another suppose that they have shared
purposes with respect to that communication.' Two individuals
who do not speak one another's language will find it rather
difficult, without further aids, to make sense of what the other
says. Although we offer no particularly sophisticated view about
how "sharing in common" is accomplished, we make the simple
point that an assessment of a communication's meaning
requires, at the very least, a sharing in common.
6 WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIoNARY 367 (2d ed. 1983).
See Boudreau et al., The Intentional(ist) Stance, supra note 1, at 2140-42.
8 The sharing-in-common phenomenon has been examined in several fields
of study. Disciplines ranging from communication theory to linguistics to anthropology
continue to advance our understanding of these vital questions.
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A few scientific propositions about human
communication can aid those who seek to determine what a
statute's authors meant when they chose to include (or to not
include) particular words in a piece of legislation. To this end,
we build from well-known communication theories. The key
insight of these theories is that successful inference about
meaning requires that the manner in which a communication
is decoded (i.e., the expansion of the signal into information)
relate to aspects of its manufacture (i.e., the compression of
information into a signal) in particular ways.9 What this insight
suggests for scholars of statutory interpretation (and for judges
interpreting statutes) is that discerning the meaning of any
piece of legislation requires an understanding of how it was
manufactured throughout the legislative process."
Communication involves both a sender and a receiver,
both of whom must usually make costly efforts to ensure that a
message is faithfully received. Basic tenets of information
theory suggest that communication can be viewed as a series of
processes (represented in Figure 1 below) where an idea borne
in the sender's mind (1) is transcribed in a message that, (2)
with some distortion, is transmitted to the receiver, with error,
and (3) received and decoded by the receiver.
Figure 1. The Process of Communication
Message Signal Signal Message
Source -+ Compression -* Channel Expansion -- Receiver
with Noise
The process of communication and the requirements for
accurate interpretation are the same for statutes as they are
for all other forms of communication. Indeed, the literature on
communication theory and cognitive science suggests that the
communication process is ubiquitous; that is, whether we are
communicating written words, electrical signals, spoken
9 Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 959.
SPIERCE, supra note 5, at 118; Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra
note 1, at 959.
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language, gestures, or viruses, all communication involves the
processes of compression and expansion." In general,
compression takes a large domain of information and
transforms it flexibly so that the compression can be carried
forward for future expansion. Ideas and concepts are
compressed into language and transmitted by actions such as
speaking, writing, and gesturing; this is analogous to the
process by which our voices are compressed into electrical
signals, transmitted, and then expanded back into sound waves
when we talk on the phone.
In the communication process, the signal begins as a
message that the sender transmits through a channel. In the
channel, the message is compressed into a signal, which then
passes through a transmitter. The transmitter then sends the
signal along one or more channels to the receiver, who expands
the signal back into a message. At the end of the process, the
receiver discerns from the message the information that was
successfully transmitted.
Crucially, successful communication depends both on
the sender's ability to properly compress the message being
sent and on the receiver's ability to correctly perceive the
message and to apply the correct expansion algorithm to
reverse the compression process. 2 In an ideal world, the
expansion algorithm would precisely match the compression
algorithm used to send the original message. As communication
in the real world departs from this ideal, the receiver's ability
to faithfully decode the original message deteriorates.
To this point, our depiction of the compression-
expansion process has neglected the identity of the sender and
the recipient. In the context of statutory lawmaking, the sender
is the legislature, and the recipient is anyone who needs to
understand the statute's meaning. To sharpen this matter, we
focus on judicial statutory interpretation. While courts are
certainly not the only-and perhaps not even the primary-
intended recipients of the communication, they do, at the very
least, play a key role in interpreting statutory meaning and, to
that end, frame the process as a communication in which the
" See generally GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER, THE WAY WE THINK
CONCEPTUAL BLENDING AND THE MIND'S HIDDEN COMPLEXITIES (2002); RAY JACKENDOFF,
PATTERNS IN THE MIND: LANGUAGE AND HUMAN NATURE (1993); C. E. Shannon, A
Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECHNICAL J. 379 (1948).
12 See generally ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998).
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structure of compression and expansion help the interpreter
better illuminate the task at hand.
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT, AUTHORITY, AND PROCESS
Who, after all, is doing the communicating? As Larry
Alexander and James Brudney have rightly noted in their
response to our recent article,13 a key puzzle in an account of
statutory meaning that looks squarely to communication theory
is how to best view the 535 federal legislators (perhaps adding
the President to this mix as well). Can we overcome the
objection that Congress, being a "they" not an "it," is hard to
perceive as any sort of communicator?" While this observation is
particularly potent in connection with our description, it is not a
new critique. Many prominent scholars have raised various
objections to the notion of collective meaning in connection with
"intentionalist" theories of statutory interpretation more
generally. The critiques are powerful, if somewhat far-flung-
sometimes raising social-choice-related critiques to legislative
intent, other times questioning the metaphysical properties of
(to use William Buzbee's felicitous phrase) the "one Congress
fiction" of statutory interpretation," and generally questioning
the idea that legislative will is reduced to an act of
communication from a body with a singular will.
Though appreciating the dilemma of drawing
conclusions about legislative intent from evidence produced
within a collective body, our basic responses track two large
themes. First, we insist that the act of communication manifest
through legislative action is that established by a distinct
public act (i.e., a statute) whose pedigree is established by
constitutional rules of enactment-namely, the final vote on
passage. Whatever we might say about the greater political
stature of a law enacted by, say, 500 legislators than one
enacted by a slim majority, we would never say that the former
is a statute and the latter is not. Article I, Section 7, of the U.S.
13 Larry Alexander, How to Understand Legislatures: A Comment on
Boudreau, Lupia, McCubbins, and Rodriguez, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993 (2007); James
J. Brudney, Intentionalism's Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001 (2007).
'4 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992). For a rejoinder, see
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory Is
Misapplied Against Legislative Intent, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 585 (2005).
" William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2000).
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Constitution gives the legislature the authority to convert its
myriad individual preferences (or hopes, dreams, etc.) into a
statute, and it does so by the requirement of majority assent. 16
The realities of the legislative process are, of course,
considerably more complicated than this simple resort to an
Article I provision would suggest. But our point here is that
constitutional rules of procedure solve what would be an
insurmountable problem of aggregating heterogeneous
individual intentions into a collective intent. Meaningful
communication is not the extrinsically derived aggregation of
intent but the statute that is enacted. We have called this
understanding-with a hat tip to philosopher Daniel Dennett-
the "intentional(ist) stance,"" a phrase capturing the use of
intent as a heuristic device to understand communication
rather than an admittedly intractable inquiry into the
epistemology of multiple intentions.
Second, we see legislative intent in the details of
legislative procedure-this time focusing on the practical
dimensions of legislative procedure, rather than specific
constitutional constructions, to support the idea that statutes
are meaningful communications." Some scholars have taken
the view that legislative intent is meaningless, concluding that
statutes do not accurately track the democratic will of
disagreeing legislators.19 However, the constitution of
legislative procedure that enables diverse lawmakers to
collaborate on legislative initiatives and pass (with some
frequency) statutes in a polarized environment belies the
contention that legislative processes are simply too chaotic or
incoherent to warrant authority and respect. To be sure, we
have not offered any response to the democratic objection. Our
16 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
17 Boudreau et al., The Intentional(ist) Stance, supra note 1, at 2131-32, 2138-43.
18 Professor Lawrence Solan has written extensively-and, to us,
persuasively-about legislatures' capacity to implement through its statutory text a
publicly available legislative intent. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language,
Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO.
L.J. 427 (2005). Although Solan is interested squarely in the insight of cognitive
psychology (particularly, "theories of mind") and its application to collective intent, he
focuses fruitfully on the construction of the legislative process as a mechanism for
synthesizing and articulating collective intent through rationally constructed
procedures and instruments. Id. at 444-49. In referring to Congress's delegation of
lawmaking prerogatives to legislative committees, for example, Professor Solan notes
succinctly that "not only does the legislature form its plans through the work of a small
number of its members, but it is structured to do things just that way." Id. at 446.
' See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Lupia &
McCubbins, supra note 14, at 594-98; Shepsle, supra note 14.
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burden here, however, is more modest: to (at least) support the
argument that statutes are meaningful communications and,
moreover, that legislative processes facilitate these
communications by enabling legislators to negotiate
discernible, enactable outcomes.
We cannot answer the question, "what do statutes
mean?," without first considering the question, "how are
statutes made?" The legislative process defines the
compression algorithm with which congressional
communications are transmitted. Thus, efforts to interpret
law-to essentially construct an expansion process that most
closely resembles the compression process-must begin with a
coherent theory of lawmaking. While we present one such
theory elsewhere,20 any model of the legislative process must
define how multiple legislators successfully coordinate to
collectively adopt a single statute (the. communication) and the
internal legislative process through which law is made.
III. COMMUNICATION AND INTERPRETATION
In our view, statutes are compressed policy instructions
or procedural guidelines, chosen by the legislators who pass
them (specifically, members of the majority party); subsequent
actors (such as judges, agencies, or citizens) are left to expand a
statute's meaning when applying or interpreting it. Because
discerning the meaning of these communications requires
corresponding compression and expansion schemes, the
interpretation of federal statutes must begin with an
examination of the congressional legislative process. If we ignore
the process by which members of the majority party compress
meaning when writing statutes, how are we to develop an
expansion scheme that accurately discerns such meaning? We
cannot develop a proper expansion scheme without an
understanding of the legislative process. For this reason, we now
briefly discuss the various stages of the legislative process with
an eye toward developing a corresponding expansion scheme
that jurists can use when interpreting statutes.
Federal legislators in the United States must go through a
number of stages to pass statutes, and crucially, the majority
party in each chamber has a veto (or vetoes) over what gets
20 See Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 971-81.
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passed.21 Indeed, legislators typically delegate the legislature's
agenda-setting authority and the task of allocating the
legislature's scarce resources to the majority-party leadership.
Given this delegation of authority, the issue becomes how
members assure that the people to whom agenda-setting power
has been delegated do not take advantage of this authority and
use it for their own personal gain. In general, legislators use
checks and balances to solve this dilemma. They provide others
with a veto over the actions of agenda setters, and give others an
opportunity and incentive to act as checks. These checks and
balances may be very subtle. In the U.S. House of
Representatives, for example, backbenchers may check their
leaders' actions through the committee process and must give
their approval to their leaders' actions on the floor of the chamber.
For our purposes, it is important to note the numerous
places where a statute may be discussed, revised, or amended by
legislators in the majority party. For example, in the initial
stages of the congressional lawmaking process, the majority-
party members of substantive committees in each chamber have
significant agenda control within their jurisdiction. It is at this
stage where the drafting of statutes begins, where the writing of
committee reports takes place, and where conversations between
committee chairs and majority-party committee members are
held. Additionally, because the majority party in Congress
always holds a majority of seats on each substantive committee,
members of the minority party are largely shut out, even at this
early stage of the legislative process.
As a given proposal approaches the floor, the majority
party's influence continues to grow. Indeed, the majority
party's members delegate to their leadership a broad variety of
matters. The Rules Committee and the Speaker, the Senate
majority leader (and, in many cases, the Senate minority
leader)-as well as the Budget and Appropriations Committees
if any funding is required to implement the proposal-check
21 See generally GARY W. Cox & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE
LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993); GARY W. Cox & MATHEW D.
MCCUBBINS, SE'TTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 42 (2005); D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D.
MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE
APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 34 (1991); Gerald Gamm & Steven S. Smith, Policy
Leadership and the Development of the Modern Senate, in PARTY, PROCESS, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS
287 (David Brady & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2002); Charles 0. Jones, Joseph G.
Cannon & Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of
Representatives, 30 J. POL. 617, 617-18 (1968).
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committee members' ability to propose legislation, for these two
central coordinating bodies control access to plenary time. If a
substantive committee's proposal is not representative of the
majority party's collective interests, and if it is an issue of
importance to the majority party, then either the Speaker or
the Rules Committee is likely to kill the proposal.
Before a proposal leaves the chamber, there are floor
debates, floor amendments, and the votes themselves. During
floor debates, the bill manager for the majority party controls
the time devoted to debate and to particular amendments,
determining which members speak and for how long. It is not
unusual for a number of amendments to be added to a proposal
during this stage unless, as in the House, the majority-party-
controlled Rules Committee grants a special rule that limits
the number and nature of amendments (in the Senate, bills are
often considered under Unanimous Consent Agreements, or the
majority leader can "fill the agenda tree," leaving no room for
other amendments to be offered). And given the majority
party's influence at nearly every stage of the legislative
process, by the time the proposed legislation reaches a final-
passage vote on the floor, the majority party has typically
ensured its own victory (although there are occasionally
instances where the majority party and its leaders must corral
a few additional votes on the floor).
The congressional process is, in essence, a running
conversation in which some members-specifically those to
whom the majority party has delegated authority to set the
agenda and write statutes-use the tools required by their
principals (e.g., committee reports, statements by the bill
manager, communications by the party whips, etc.) to signal the
meaning of their actions (i.e., the statutes they have written) to
the remaining members of the majority party. As we discuss
below, checks and balances within the legislative process serve
to make these communications trustworthy. The system may not
be transparent to members of the minority party-who are often
even left out of committee meetings and hearings, and have
limited influence in the choice of statutory language both in
committee and on the floor. However, the system is transparent
for members of the majority party, as the discussion above
demonstrates. Throughout the legislative process, the
compression of legislative meaning occurs in several ways and at
a variety of stages, beginning with the drafting of statutes,
proceeding to the writing of committee reports and the debating
of statutes on the floor, and ending with the bill manager's
[Vol. 76:3988
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statements and floor amendments. Because each stage involves
the compression of meaning on the part of legislators in the
majority party, a proper expansion scheme must correspond to
these stages. In other words, to properly expand the compressed
communication, the interpreter must understand the processes
by which the communication has worked its way through the
legislative process.
Identifying these key actors and paying particular
attention to the pivotal role of some legislators (or some small
body of legislators) in the legislative process can often help
judges adjudicate between competing candidate interpretations
of the same statute.2 2 To be sure, minority-party legislators, as
Professor Brudney helpfully reminds us, are important players
in the legislative process.' Minority-party legislators are
particularly influential in the Senate, where traditional norms
of Senate process impact in various ways the ability of pure
majorities to implement their will." But this point depicts
statutes as the revealed will of majority-party preferences, a
depiction to which we do not subscribe. We see statutes as the
products of complex bargaining processes; they are instruments
of a diverse set of legislators and will entail judgments,
compromises, and tradeoffs involving members of both parties.
And we certainly agree that "the architecture of legislative
conversations culminating in enactment may also vary based
on the subject matter area being addressed by Congress."" The
generalization we draw from the large literature on
congressional process and performance is three-fold: First,
legislators develop and use internal lawmaking processes to
facilitate their discrete aims. Second, they collaborate,
cooperate, and occasionally compete with others on these
agendas. And third, the outcome of these processes is statutes
that communicate meaningful information about what a
majority of Congress enacted into law. Furthermore, whatever
we can learn about how legislators forged these deals will help
us better understand the meaning of what they enacted.
2 See generally Rodriguez & Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History, supra note 4; McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter &
Spring 1994, at 3; McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992).
23 Brudney, supra note 13, at 1013-16.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1016.
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IV. POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY OF LAWMAKING AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Communication theory and a theory of lawmaking
based on positive political theory (PPT) can help illuminate
some of the key issues in statutory interpretation." Moreover,
we will say more ambitiously (if still tentatively) that these
twin theories can support particular interpretive techniques-
for instance, an informed use of legislative history to resolve
disagreements over statutory meaning. To generate further
conversation along these lines, we offer some thoughts about
the canons of statutory interpretation. In general, we suggest
that these canons' suitability to resolving interpretive issues be
judged by how informative they are in addressing the
compression-expansion structure and, as well, how accurately
they track the PPT of the lawmaking process.
Communication theory and PPT share in common the
recognition that the legislative process reflects a "conversation"
among legislators. Indeed, at each stage of the legislative
process, legislators communicate with each other and compress
meaning by drafting statutes, writing committee reports,
participating in floor debates, offering amendments, and
engaging in various other legislative tasks.27 In interpreting
statutes, judges must "listen to" and interpret these
"conversations." Judges must not assume that legislators were
speaking to them in their conversations; nor should judges
treat legislators' conversations as though legislators were
either naively listening to everything said in the conversation
or being lied to about everything. Instead, judges must
passively listen to legislators' conversations so that their
expansions (i.e., interpretations) correspond to the way that
statutory meaning was compressed.
Because judges are not flies on the wall during the
processes of legislative deliberation, they must orient their
interpretations of these conversations around plausible
accounts of what available information reveals.2" The debate
over the relevance and utility of legislative history deals
squarely with this difficult process. As we and others have
written, not all legislative history is equal." In addition to
26 See Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 971-81.
27 See supra Part III.
28 Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 979-81.
29 Id.
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communicating their intent, individual legislators may send
messages designed to claim credit for policy victories, to shift
blame for defeats, to jam the signals of their opponents, and,
more generally, to ensure their reelection in the next electoral
contest." Having advocated legislative history as a tool for
statutory interpretation and as a key component of our
approach, we in no way suggest that judges use legislative
history indiscriminately. Rather, we emphasize that some
aspects of legislative history are trustworthy indicia of
legislative meaning and others are not. Thus, the task for
judges interpreting statutes is to determine which aspects of
legislative history are trustworthy and to rely only upon those
aspects when discerning the meaning of statutes. Elsewhere,
we provide some key criteria judges can use to identify
trustworthy sources of information."
This process also implicates debates over the use of
canons of statutory construction. Consider, for example, the
plain-meaning approach to statutory construction, a general
approach undergirded by the canon that statutory language
should be accorded its plain-rather than any especially
imaginative or counterintuitive-meaning." The suitability of
this hoary rule turns squarely on what we expect to be the
processes by which legislators have compressed their
communications in the first instance and, in turn, what their
expectations are with respect to the processes of expansion by the
receiver. Where certain language has a plain meaning-without
making any effort here to define what is or is not plain-the
plain meaning would seem to have the great asset of minimizing
noise and, within the structure of the compression-expansion
algorithm central to the communication process, minimizing the
risk of error. Yet the plain-meaning approach goes wrong in its
positive assertion that language usually does have a plain
meaning and that the process is not really about interpretation
3o See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
(2d ed. 1974).
3' See Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 971-79.
32 While plain-meaning interpretation has often been treated synonymously
with interpretive textualism, it is important to see them as distinct. Textualism refers
to a comprehensive theory of interpretation that regards the text as the only legitimate
subject of interpretation and sees extrinsic evidence of statutory meaning (such as
legislative history) as irrelevant to the enterprise. Reference to plain-meaning
interpretation has in mind a particular perspective on how one reads the text and thus
is seen properly as a rule of interpretation.
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and is merely a matter of application.' In short, what we need to
know to make use of this canon are (at least) two critical things:
(1) the capacity of language in a particular instance to be
rendered to a plain (rather than, to use a clumsy term, "unplain")
meaning, and (2) the expected treatment of certain language by
those with authorized involvement in both the compression and
expansion process. If we lack sufficient knowledge in either of
these dimensions-and, to be sure, our focus in this essay is on
the second of these matters-then the plain-meaning canon will
not meet its intended goals. So "it depends" is all we are in a
strong position to say about the plain-meaning canon in the
context of statutory interpretation generally.
Next, consider rules that impute to the legislature the
intent to create broad remedial policies where the language used
in the statute does not point ambiguously in the direction of
those policies. Examples of these rules include the implied right
of action, the presumption of reviewability, and the old canon
that liberal statutes be broadly construed. While they reflect
different aims and histories, they are of a common piece with the
notion that proper statutory interpretation puts a thumb on the
scale in favor of "progressive" social policy. Relatedly, it gives an
edge to judicial intervention (as in the case of the implied right
of action and the reviewability presumption). From our
perspective, these rules, taken as a whole, are inconsistent with
both the structured process of communication and, as well, the
positive political theory of lawmaking.
First, these rules essentially rewrite the statute to
insert provisions regarding the statute's scope and the
procedures to be followed in the statute's implementation. So,
for example, the creation of an implied right of action adds
language where none existed; it also reorients the
administration of the statute (an administration that will
frequently entail an administrative agency) by adding a new
institution to the mix-an institution with its own roles, rules,
and powers." A statute might have, in the first instance,
contained an administrative mechanism that gave relevant
legislative committees and subcommittees principal
For especially influential renderings of this claim, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw (1997); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988).
Cf. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in
Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1992).
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prerogative to engage in various forms of "police patrol" or "fire
alarm" oversight." Interposing a court in this process by
providing a route to judicial review will inevitably, and at the
very least, reconfigure the processes of legislative scrutiny and
the general structure of policy implementation.
In essence, statutes reflect complex tradeoffs. No matter
how strongly worded a particular policy directive is,' the choice
of how best to implement this policy both in terms of the level
and technique of enforcement and in terms of the resources
devoted to these initiatives in one or another budgetary cycle (a
choice manifest acutely in the constitutionally prescribed
appropriations process) entails difficult tradeoffs. A canon that
layers onto a legislative compromise a particular directive that
the legislature either did not consider or, as is more likely,
declined to create, undermines these tradeoffs. And whatever
we might say about this strategy as a normative matter, we are
content here to say that such an interpretive rule is
fundamentally inconsistent with both the theory of
communication and the positive political theory of lawmaking.
In earlier work, we considered two additional canons-
the whole act rule and the appropriations canon-and
explained why they conflict with theories of communication
and lawmaking." The whole act rule presumes, implausibly,
that the legislature set out to write a completely coherent
policy in which all parts would mesh seamlessly and every
embedded policy would reinforce the other. This idea, too,
conflicts with the notion that statutes are inevitably about
tradeoffs and compromise. Moreover, the whole act rule
supposes that the communication being compressed and later
expanded is one omnibus communication that meets strict
standards of transitivity, consistency, and coherence. That may
well be our democratic ambition. But we can all conjure up
" See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165, 165-66 (1984).
36 For instance, the directions in the federal environmental statutes to
regulate all "significant risks" and to use the "best available technology" to clean up air
and water pollution. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(p)(1) (2006) ("Such modified
requirements shall apply the best available technology economically achievable on a
case-by-case basis, using best professional judgment, to set specific numerical effluent
limitations in each permit."); 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) ("As promptly as
practicable .. . the Administrator shall submit a report describing ... any significant
risks to human health posed by these emissions .. . .").
1 See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical
Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations
Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669 (2005).
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examples in which this ambition is not met in the crucible of
real political decision making and real statutes. Relatedly, the
claim that legislative changes made through the appropriations
process lack the deliberative qualities of substantive legislative
decisions is problematic-both from the vantage point of the
(undertheorized, empirically problematic) notion of
deliberation' and from a plausible account of how legislators
communicate through their fiscal decisions. There is absolutely
no reason to expect that the kinds of choices and tradeoffs
made by legislators in their decision making over annual
appropriations cannot be subject to exactly the same logic of
compression and expansion as can other legislative choices.
Moreover, the structures embodied in legislative decision
making on appropriations jibe in ways that have been
neglected by both political scientists and legal scholars with a
sensible account of legislative policymaking. In short, the PPT
account of the appropriations process undermines the canon of
construction invented in TVA v. Hill" and more or less followed
ever since: that legislative changes through the appropriations
process ought to be narrowly construed.
The more global lesson to draw from this analysis is
that familiar canons of statutory construction can be hard to
square with what we believe to be the best assessment of how
and why the legislature functions to communicate through the
statutory-enactment process. Still, these canons may serve
important normative goals. These goals may include the
improvement of legislative processes and the implementation of
what William Eskridge and Philip Frickey label "quasi-
constitutional" objectives.' However we evaluate the merits of
these objectives, we should see them as orthogonal to the core
positive objective of facilitating interpretive approaches that
are broadly congruent with theories of communication and
democratic lawmaking. While much has been said in the
voluminous literature on statutory interpretation-and even
more remains to be said-about these important normative
objectives, our contribution here to the debate is principally
positive; that is, we endeavor to show that plausible
" Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating
Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 39 (2006); McCubbins &
Rodriguez, supra note 37, at 691.
3 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-93 (1978).
4 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992).
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interpretive principles can be derived thoughtfully from a
model of statute making that builds upon theories of
communication and legislative process.

